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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES,
INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
-vs-

Case No. 15928

CARNES CORPORATION, a corporation, and LONG DEMING
UTAH, INC., a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., brought an
action for the collection of a sales commission against
Carnes Company 1 and Long Deming Utah, Inc.

This is an

appeal to review the decisions of the district court that
Carnes Company is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Utah Courts.
Carnes Company is an unincorporated division of
Wehr Corporation, a foreign corporation not qualified to do
business in the State of Utah.

l.

Carnes Company has appeared

See note 2 infra.
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specially throughout all of the proceedings in this action,
without entering a general appearance, and it does not enter
a general appearance now.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On October 18, 1974, and on March 5, 1975, the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, granted the motion of Carnes
Company to quash the service of summons made upon it.
On May 30, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
once again granted the motion of Carnes Company to quash the
service of suinmons made upon it.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Carnes Company prays the orders be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., is a
Utah corporation engaged in the business of distributing
heating, ventilating and refrigeration equipment for manufacturers of those products.

Defendant Carnes Corporation

(herein "Carnes") is a division of Wehr Corporation, a
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Wisconsin corporation not qualified to do business in the
State of Utah.

2

Carnes is a manufacturer of ventilation

equipment.
On approximately May 24, 1961, plaintiff entered
into a contract with Carnes.

(R. 144-154).

Under the con-

tract plaintiff agreed to act as an independent sales representative for Carnes' products in Utah and portions of Idaho
and Wyoming.

During the term of the sales agreement, plain-

tiff solicited orders for Carnes' equipment on a commission
basis.

Plaintiff also acted as a sales representative for

several competitors of Carnes, and the Carnes product-line
constituted only a small part of the plaintiff's business.
(R.

136-137).
On approximately August 29, 1968, the sales agree-

ment between plaintiff and Carnes was terminated.

Defendant

Long Deming Utah, Inc., entered into a sales agreement with
Carnes on September 3, 1968, thereby becoming the plaintiff's
successor as the sales representative of Carnes in Utah.

(R. 175).

On October 23, 1973, plaintiff filed a complaint
against Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc.,

3

in three counts:

2.

carnes Corporation later becarre an unincorporated division of
Wehr Corporation, and it is naw known as Carnes eorrpany.

3.

Long Deming Utah, Inc., is not a party to this appeal.
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(1) that the plaintiff's relationship as sales representative was terminated after the plaintiff had obtained a
tentative order for Carnes' equipment to be installed in the
proposed office building of the L.D.S. Church, and before
the construction contracts for the building were awarded;
therefore, plaintiff was entitled to the commission on the
equipment eventually ordered, notwithstanding the subsequent
sales agreement between the defendants and the provisions
plaintiff's contract;

(2)

of

that if not entitled to the full

commission, plaintiff was entitled to a portion of it; and
(3) that the defendants had conspired to terminate the
plain~~ff's

<::;t.. ::~eC:

agreement with Carnes; therefore, plaintiff was

not only to the commission lost on the office

building but to other unspecified lost commissions and
punitive damages as well.

(R. 160-163).

Plaintiff attempted to serve process on Carnes in
Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute (R. 158-159), and
also attempted to serve Carnes in Utah by service on Lyn
Felton.

(R. 156).

At the time of service on October 29,

1973, Mr. Felton was the vice-president of Long Deming,
Utah, Inc.

(R. 496-497).
On November 28, 1973, Carnes filed a motion pur-

suant to Rule l2(b)(2),(4), and (5), U.R.C.P., to quash the
service and dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
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court did not have jurisdiction over Carnes.

(R. 139).

Affidavits were filed by both the plaintiff and Carnes
(R.l33-134; 135-137), and on October 1, 1974, the motion was
heard by the Honorable Gordon R. Hall.

On October 18, 1974,

he entered an order quashing service and dismissing plaintiff's complaint against Carnes, the court having no jurisdiction.

(R. 121-122).

Plaintiff then filed a motion for

reconsideration or to vacate or, in the alternative, amend
judgment.

(R. 133-114).
On November 7, 1974, plaintiff filed a motion for

the issuance of a writ of attachment.
was granted

~

(R. 109).

The motion

parte by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,

Jr., on the same day, and a writ was thereafter issued and
served.

(R. 105-106).

The order authorizing the writ was

obtained without notice to Carnes' or its counsel, nor was
Carnes' counsel given notice either before or after the
actual issuance of the writ.

Upon learning of the attach-

ment, Carnes filed a motion for its release.

(R. 102).

At

the time of the attachment proceedings, Judge Hall's order
to quash service and dismiss the complaint against Carnes
had been entered and was effective pending only the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

The latter motion, dated

October 25, 1974, was not noticed for hearing until Carnes'
original notice of January 14, 1975.

(R. 93).
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On March 5, 1975, Judge Hall, after argument,
reconsidered his earlier order and, although declining to
amend his determination that jurisdiction had not been
obtained over Carnes, he ruled that the complaint itself
should remain in good standing in the event jurisdiction
could be obtained later.

(R. 74-75).

Plaintiff filed a

notice of intent to appeal.
In an order dated March 28, 1975, Judge Hanson
released the attachment on the basis of Carnes' motion.
(R. 65-66).

In his order, however, Judge Hanson included a

paragraph which noted that the filing of the motion for the
release of the attachment constituted a general appearance
by

Carnes.

The question of whether Carnes had been properly

served either by the service on a local party or under the
long-arm statute was argued but not ruled upon because the
court had already determined a general appearance had been
made.
Carnes then filed a petition for interlocutory
appeal with this Court on the ground that Judge Hanson had
erred in holding Carnes had appeared generally.

(R. 3-7).

Plaintiff also sought interlocutory appeal on the issue of
long-arm jurisdiction.

On March 16, 1976, this Court re-

versed Judge Hanson and held that Carnes had not in fact
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entered a general appearance in this lawsuit.

See Ted R.

Brown and Associates, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206
(Utah 1976).

No action was taken on the plaintiff's request

for interlocutory appeal.
Despite Judge Hall's ruling that the long-arm
statute did not apply and this Court's refusal to review
that ruling, plaintiff persisted in its attempts to relitigate the issue.

On February 10, 1977, plaintiff filed a

Motion for Order Declaring Service of Summons on Carnes
Corporation Sufficient, Directing Carnes to Respond or Be
Found in Default.

(R. 197-199).

Paragraph 5 of that motion

provided:
5.
By virtue of discovery procedures
carried out by the Plaintiff, information
has now been obtained and is set forth in
the Stipulation duly signed by ROBERT D.
MERRILL, Attorney for LONG DEMING UTAH,
INC., which sets forth information sufficient to show that CARNES CORPORATION did
in fact do business within the State of
Utah within the statutory definition of
the Long Arm Statute 78-27-23 U.C.A. 1953,
as amended and is thereby subject to service under said statute as doing business
within the state of Utah as defined by
Statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah.
Plaintiff's motion was heard on February 17, 1977, by the
Honorable Hal

s.

Taylor.

He entered an order on March 3,

1977, denying plaintiff's motion.

(R. 222-223).
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In March, 1977, plaintiff again attempted to serve
Carnes in Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute (R. 234235) and also attempted to serve Carnes in Utah by service
on Richard Barrett McDowell.

(R. 229-230).

At the time of

service on March 15, 1977, Mr. McDowell was the vice-president of Utemp, Inc.

(R. 599-600).

Utemp was a Utah corpora-

tion which conducted portions of its business activities
through its unincorporated division known as Utah Air Sales.
Long Deming Utah, Inc.'s status as a sales representative of
Carnes was terminated on September 15, 1975, and Utah Air
Sales had succeeded to that position.

(R.

251).

On April 6, 1977, Carnes again filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (2),

(3),

(4) and (5), U.R.C.P.,

on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over
Carnes.

(R. 232).

considerations:

The motion to dismiss was based on two

(1) that the complaint served in Utah on

Mr. McDowell was insufficient as service of process on
Carnes under Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.; and

(2)

that the

issues of whether Carnes was doing business in the State of
Utah and whether the Utah courts thereby acquired jurisdiction over Carnes pursuant to the long-arm statute, had
already been determined adversely to plaintiff on three
separate occasions and they should not be litigated again.
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On April 21, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion for an
order designating a special hearing on Carnes' motion to
dismiss.

(R.

237-238).

The special hearing would, accord-

ing to the plaintiff, enable it to present witnesses, introduce documents and evidence, and present extensive argument,
all designed to demonstrate that the state courts had jurisdiction over Carnes.

The hearing was opposed by Carnes on

the elementary ground there were no issues concerning service of process and jurisdiction which remained to be decided.
(R. 269).
On August 23, 1977, the plaintiff's motion for a
special evidentiary hearing and Carnes' motion to dismiss
were heard by the Honorable David B. Dee.

On November 13,

1977, Judge Dee issued a memorandum decision in which he
denied Carnes' motion to dismiss.

He granted, instead, the

plaintiff's motion for a special hearing, authorizing the
introduction into evidence of all facts concerning Carnes'
activities in the state in order to determine whether it was
doing business here and had thereby subjected itself to the
jurisdiction of the state courts.

(R. 306-307).

On December 16, 1977, Carnes filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal to this Court from Judge Dee's order.
The petition was denied on January 9, 1978.

(R. 320).
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The evidentiary hearing granted to the plaintiff
by Judge Dee was held on January 11-12, 1978, before the
Honorable Peter F. Leary.

On the basis of that hearing

Judge Leary granted Carnes' motion to dismiss.

He specifi-

cally held that service of process on Mr. Felton and on Mr.
McDowell was not service on Carnes, and that no evidence
supporting the applicability of the long-arm statute was
presented that was not available to the plaintiff when the
jurisdiction issue was originally raised and litigated in
1974 before Judge Hall.

(R.

322-326, 350-356).

This appeal followed.

ARGUMENT
Introduction
This appeal is not concerned with the merits of
the plaintiff's claims, but only with the question of personal jurisdiction over Carnes.

Plaintiff has argued its

position four times and on each occasion Carnes has prevailed.

Now, for the fifth time, plaintiff seeks another

opportunity to articulate the same issue.

Its attempts to

litigate the issue repeatedly, each time piecing-in slightly
more evidence until its position, hopefully, meets with
success, cannot be countenanced.

Plaintiff had its day in
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court.

It cannot now be heard to say after losing that it

should be given further opportunity to develop its case.
Carnes contends the orders dismissing it from this
action, based on the state courts' lack of jurisdiction over
it, should be affirmed.

This must be the result in view of

the substantial evidence previously presented to the trial
courts.

I.

THE APPEAL IS PREMATURE SINCE
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDERS ARE
NOT FINAL AND IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE.

There is, at the outset, a genuine question of
this Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Court's

authority to review the decisions of the district courts is
specifically limited by law to final orders and judgments.
See, e.g., Utah Const. Art. VIII, §9; §78-4-17 Utah Code
Ann.

(1953); Rule 72(a), U.R.C.P.

The two orders appealed

by the plaintiff are not final and, therefore, they are not
now appealable to this Court.

The appeal is premature.

Where, as here, several defendants are charged
with concerted wrongdoing,

4

an order dismissing one of them

from the action for lack of personal jurisdiction is not

4.

Both the complaint and amended cc:rnplaint allege that Carnes
and Long Deming Utah, Inc., conspired to terminate the plaintiff's
sales representative contract. The prayer for that claim seeks
relief from the defendants jointly. (R. 160-163; 337-341).
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immediately appealable as a final decision.

Rule 54(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the entry of a
judgment in actions with multiple parties; it provides:
When more than one claim for relief
is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment.
In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
Under the rule, then, an order or other form of decision,
however designated, is not final if it adjudicates any of
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties
in the action.

The order may become final and immediately

appealable only after the district court has completed two
tasks:

(1) it must make an express determination that there

is no just reason for a delay in the entry of the judgment;
and

(2) it must expressly direct the entry of the judgment.
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The objective of the rule is to prevent the unnecessary expense and delay of piecemeal appeals by requiring the parties to present the whole cause for review in a single
appeal.
There are no Utah cases which have addressed this
precise issue under Rule 54(b) of the Utah procedural rules. 5
There is, however, persuasive authority from other jurisdictions which indicates that the dismissal of fewer than all
parties for lack of personal jurisdiction falls squarely
within the ambit of the rule.

For example, decisions inter-

preting Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

5.

Rule 54 (b) has been addressed by this Court in only one reported decision, that of M & S Construction and Engineering eo.
v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970).
That opinion dealt with the issue of multiple claims under the rule
rather than the issue of multiple parties, as here. 'Ihe plaintiff's complaint had been dismissed with prejudice by the district
court, and one of the two defendants had been granted judgment on
its counterclaim against the plaintiff and it also had been granted
judgment on its =ss-clairn against the other defendant. The
Suprerre Court reversed the dismissal of the complaint but it refused to disturb the defendant's judgments on its counterclaim and
cross-claim. In light of the reversal and rerrand for trial, less
than all of the claims presented in the action had been adjudicated; there had been no express determination by the district
court as required in Rule 54 (b) ; and, therefore, the defendant's
judgments were not final, were subject to revision, and could not
then be reviewed by the Suprerre Court.
The opinion is i.mp::Jrtant here for its unequivocal recognition
of the necessity for the district court's "certification" under
Rule 54 (b) in actions of multiple claims and/or parties. Without
certification, the order is not final and imrediately appealable.
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which is virtually identical to the Utah rule,

6

hold that in

these circumstances such jurisdictional orders are not final
and not appealable without the district court's certification.

See, e.g., Bernardi Bros., Inc. v. Pride Manufactur-

ing, Inc., 427 F.2d 297

(3rd Cir. 1970)

(where district

court entered its certificate, the appeal was valid from an
order dismissing the corporate defendant for lack of jurisdiction and the action remained pending for another defendant); Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,

6.

411 F.2d 812 (2nd

The Utah rule contains two minor changes of phraseology,
including a substitution of "and/or" for "or" after "third-party
::laim," and an insertion of "by the court" after "express determination," both in the first sentence. The federal rule provides:

When more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
or third-party claim, or when rrul tiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination that there is no just
reascn for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, ho.vever designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as
to any of the claims or parties , and the order
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any ti.m2 before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
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Cir. 1969)

(in wrongful death action, district court dis-

missed non-resident defendants for lack of jurisdiction and
entered a 54(b) certificate from which valid appeal was
taken); United

States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ameri-

can State Bank, 372 F.2d 449 (lOth Cir. 1967)

(where the

district court executed its certificate under Rule 54(b),
the appeal was valid from an order of the trial court vacating its previous order allowing the filing of the thirdparty complaint, quashing the service, and dismissing them
from the action); see generally 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice •54.27[6] at 343-344 (2d ed. 1978).
It is readily apparent from a review of the record
that neither Judge Hall nor Judge Leary was requested by
plaintiff to enter the necessary two-prong determination
under Rule 54(b).

II.

The orders are, therefore, not appealable.

JUDGE LEARY PROPERLY DETERMINED
AFTER A HEARING THAT JUDGE HALL'S
DETERMINATION WAS CORRECT.

In his order of May 30, 1978, Judge Leary granted
Carnes' motion to dismiss, thereby quashing service of process upon it.

(R. 355).

In addition, he specifically held

as follows:
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Substantially all of the evidence presented before this Court was peculiarly within the knowledge of Plaintiff, was obtainable
by interrogation of the witnesses Young and
Tregeagle, or by discovery prior to the hearing before Judge Hall on or about October 1,
1974.
(R. 355).
He explained the latter holding more thoroughly in his memorandurn decision.

(R. 324-325).

He noted that the plaintiff

had both a right and an opportunity to present evidence in
opposition to Carnes' motion to dismiss before Judge Hall on
October 1, 1974; that the plaintiff had ample time between
the filing of the complaint (October 26, 1973) and the hearing before Judge Hall (October 1, 1974) in which to conduct
iisccvery related to the applicability of the long-arm statute to Carnes and related to any agency relationship between Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc., for purposes of
service under Rule 4(e); and that plaintiff did not commence
discovery until January 8, 1975.

He concluded, therefore,

that since substantially all of the evidence presented to
him could have been presented timely to Judge Hall, he would
not overrule Judge Hall's prior decision of dismissal.
The record supports Judge Leary's reasoning.

In

the hearing of October 1, 1974, before Judge Hall, the plaiY
tiff did not attempt to present substantial evidence concerning Carnes' business activities in Utah.

It offered only a
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single, conclusionary affidavit from its corporate president.

(R. 133-134).

This point is even more significant

given the two additional considerations that the plaintiff
took it upon itself to notice-up the Carnes' motion for a
hearing, and that the hearing date was at least ten (10)
months subsequent to the date on which the motion was originally filed with the court by Carnes.

During this time

span the plaintiff could have conducted discovery related to
the jurisdictional issues.

Although plaintiff had the oppor-

tunity to submit any interrogatories, depose any witnesses
or parties, file requests for admission or seek the production of any documents that would support its case, it elected
to notice Carnes' motion for hearing before the court on the
strength of its president's affidavit only.

Plaintiff had

its day in court and, as Judge Leary concluded, it cannot
now be heard to say after losing that it should be given
further opportunity to develop its case.

The issues of

whether Carnes was doing business in the State of Utah and
whether the state courts thereby acquired jurisdiction over
Carnes, were already submitted to the court and the issues
decided.
The plaintiff's criticism of Judge Leary's conclusion is two-fold.

7.

First, 7 it concedes that evidence could

Appellant's Brief at 48-49.
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have been presented to Judge Hall but only in the form of
affidavits.

And, it suggests that if more formal and exten-

sive evidence should have been presented, there is nothing
in the record which indicates the plaintiff failed to request such a hearing before Judge Hall.
the argument is brief.

Carnes' response to

Plaintiff bears the responsibility

of preparing its own case.

It alone must decide what evi-

dence to offer, when to do so and in what manner.

If it

considered affidavits inadequate, it should have pursued
alternate tactics.
l~g

If it deemed a formal evidentiary hear-

to be crucial it should have demanded it in a manner

ceslgned to protect its record.
Second,B plaintiff contends the issue of overruling Judge Hall's determination was never presented to Judge
Leary.

In fact, quite the opposite is true.

During the

evidentiary hearing before Judge Leary, counsel for Carnes
repeatedly objected to matters on the basis they had already
been presented to Judge Hall and decided.

(See, e.g., R.

422; 497; 514-515).

8.

Appellant's Brief at 50-51.

-18-
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III.

CARNES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURTS
UNDER THE LONG-ARM STATUTE.

Plaintiff insists Carnes has actively transacted
business in Utah within the meaning of the Utah Long-Arm
Statute and is, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of
the local courts.

Whatever the conceptual simplicity of

plaintiff's argument in its brief, it wholly ignores both
the facts of this case and the controling legal principles.
In several paragraphs

9

plaintiff belittles Carnes'

legal argument to Judge Hall that the plaintiff's claims did
not arise within the coverage of the long-arm statute.
the contrary, that argument is correct.

To

It is important to

remember that the complaint served on Carnes in Wisconsin in
1977 was identical in language to the one originally filed
by the plaintiff in 1973.

Neither made an allegation of

specific types of conduct which should render Carnes subject
to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts.

Rather, they merely

recited that jurisdiction was based on a single subparagraph
of the long-arm statute, §78-27-24(2), and on related but
unspecified provisions of the Utah Code.

That provisions

provides as follows:

9.

Appellant's Brief at 38, 45-46.
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Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this
state, who in person or through an agent, does
any of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:

*

*

*

(2)
Contracting to supply services or goods in
this state;

*

*

*

On the basis of this jurisdictional allegation Carnes moved
to dismiss this action on November 28, 1973.

It set forth

seve:cal arguments in its supporting memorandum.
flrs~,

(R.

125-132).

it contended that the long-arm statute provision

relied on by the plaintiff was inapplicable to the plaintiff's claims.
Utah Code Ann.

It is critical to observe that §78-27-26
(1953) permits only those claims arising from

acts specifically enumerated in §78-27-24 to be asserted
against a defendant over whom jurisdiction is based on the
long-arm statute.

The plaintiff's claims did not arise

from Carnes' contractual agreement to supply equipment to
third parties in the State of Utah.

There have been no

claims covering that equipment, either the manner in which
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it was supplied or its quality.

Indeed not.

This cause of

action arose, as stated in the complaint, solely from an
allged breach and wrongful termination of the plaintiff's
sales representative agreement with Carnes.

The equipment

supplied by Carnes to the church office building has nothing
to do with the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract,
other than to establish a measure of damages for the lost
sales commissions.
fore,

Subsection (2) of §78-27-24 cannot, there-

support a claim of jurisdiction over Carnes.
Plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint in

January, 1978, in order to plead jurisdiction on the specific basis of the entire Utah Long-Arm Statute and those provisions in §§78-27-20,to 28 Utah Code Ann.

(1953), and also

on the general basis of a repetitive, blanket statement that
Carnes had done business within the State of Utah.

Atten-

tion is, therefore, directed to the entire Utah Long-Arm
Statute.
The Utah Supreme Court first interpreted the longarm statute in Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d
332 (1971).

There, an employee commenced an action in the

Utah state courts against his former employer, a Texas
corporation.

The defendant was a parent corporation of

-21-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

numerous wholly-owned subsidiary corporations operating as
retail outlets throughout the United States, including Utah.
The plaintiff had been employed for nine and one-half years
in several of the defendant's subsidiaries.

Plaintiff

brought suit in Utah for wages and fringe benefits he
claimed due for services rendered to one of the defendant's
subsidiaries in another state.

Service of process was made

upon the assistant vice-president and regional manager of
the defendant, whose office was in Utah.
The district court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss the action on the ground that the defendant was a
:0reig2 corporation
Nc~~~~

not subject to service of process

the State of Utah.

This Court reversed an appeal,

holding that the defendant corporation had, in a continuous
and regular manner over a period of years, maintained such
contacts and carried on such activities within the state of
Utah that it should be subject to the jurisdiction of its
courts.

The Court noted that the officers and directors of

the defendant were practically identical with those of its
Utah subsidicaries; that the defendant had engaged in adver·
tising and other promotional activity in Utah; that in its
promotional activity the defendant gave no indication the
local subsidiaries were separate corporate entities from t~
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parent; and that the defendant exercised extensive control
over the business operations of its local subsidiaries,
including control of security, auditing, receipts, disbursements, and employee wages and incentive awards.
In reaching its decision the Court analyzed the
provisions of the Utah long-arm statute, and it expressed
the appropriate judicial inquiry in the following manner:
It is appreciated that the language [of
the long-arm statute] just quoted is necessarily
a broad-sounding generality; and that it must be
so interpreted and applied as to conform with
basic concepts of fairness and due process of
law.
This mandates that a foreign corporation
should not be subjected to undue difficulties
from lawsuits merely because its products are
distributed in this State, or may be purchased
and sold by others therein ....

*

*

*

When the problem [of acquiring jurisdiction over a foreign corporation] arises, its
solution depends on whether it can fairly be
said that the corporation is doing business
within the State in a real and substantial
sense.
This involves the analysis of a number
of factors, none of which is alone the sine
qua non to establish a business presence in
the State, but from a consideration of the
total picture as to the existence or absence
of them the answer to that critical question
is to be found:
1.
Whether there are local offices,
stores or outlets;
2.
The presence of personnel, how
hired, fired and paid; the degree of control and the nature of their duties;
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3.
The manner of holding out to
the public by way of advertising, telephone listings, catalogs, etc.;
4.
The presence of its property, real
or personal, or interest therein, including
inventories, bank accounts, etc.;
5.
Whether the activities are sporatic or transitory as compared to continuous
and systematic;
6.
The extent to which the alleged
facts of the asserted claim arose from activities within the state;
7.
The relative hardship or convenience to the parties in being required to
litigate the controversy in the state or
elsewhere.
482 P. 2d at 333-334.

(citations omitted.)

After the Hill decision the Court consistently
applled the enumerated criteria to determine whether the
activities of a foreign corporation in this state should
subject it to the jurisdiction of the local courts.

See,

e.g., Transwestern General Agency v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1186
(Utah 1974); Mack Financial Corp. v. Nevada Motor Rentals,
Inc., 529 P. 2d 429

(Utah 1974); Kocha v. Gibson Products co.,

535 P.2d 680 (Utah 1975).

And eventually, the Court's

analysis and approach to the long-arm statute as announced
in Hill was expressly reaffirmed in its decision of Union~
Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1976) ·
There, a Utah corporation sued a California corporation for
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breach of a contract.

The contract at issue was an exclu-

sive distributorship agreement under which the defendant had
agreed to manufacture ski boots in California and supply
them to the plaintiff for distribution and sale in Utah and
elsewhere.

During the course of dealings between the par-

ties, the defendant's agents made at least four business
trips to Utah to negotiate the terms of the contract, inspect the plaintiff's facilities and operations, engage
local boot designers, and participate in meetings to plan
the sale and promotion of the boots.

The plaintiff made an

advance payment and secured a substantial order for the
boots.

The defendant never supplied any boots to the plain-

tiff.
The district court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under the longarm statute.
appeal.

The Supreme Court affirmed that decision on

It referred to the Hill criteria and noted that the

California corporation had no local office, store, property,
inventory, telephone listing or bank account and had done no
local advertising.

The Court also noted that other elements

of the arrangement had occurred outside Utah:

California

was where the contract had been executed and allegedly
breached, where the boots were to be manufactured, and where
the payments were to be made; all shipments were to be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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delivered F.O.B. the defendant's factory in California; and
California law would govern the contractual arrangement.
After Union Ski, the Hill criteria provided the
focal point of analysis in still other, subsequent cases.
See, e.g., White v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 549 P.2d 439 (Utah
1976); Cate Rental Co., Inc., v. Whalen & Co., 549 P.2d 707
(Utah 1976); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Mecham, 550 P.2d 182
(Utah 1976); Packaging Corp. of America v. Horris, 561 P.2d
680 (Utah 1977).
Finally, in its opinion of Abbott G.M. Diesel,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft,

578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978), the Court

re-evaluated the method of jurisdictional analysis it had
expressed earlier in Hill.

The Court noted a distinction

between the "doing business" and the "minimum contact"
tests.

The doing business concept allows "general" persoMl

jurisdiction (i.e., on claims which are either related or
unrelated to forum activity) over a defendant which has
substantial and continuous local activity.

The minimum

contact test under the long-arm statute is different, however.

According to the Court, it permits only the exercise

of "specific" or limited personal jurisdiction:

where a

foreign defendant has isolated, minimum contacts with the
forum through its transaction of business there, personal
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jurisdiction may be asserted only on claims arising out of
the defendant's forum activity.

Obviously, then, the min-

imum contact test is based on a measurement of the quality
and nature of the defendant's activities within the forum.
For that reason the Court suggested that the district court
conduct a hearing to resolve any conflicts of facts stated
in the competing jurisdictional arguments of the parties.
The hearing should be governed by inquiries into and an
assessment of the defendant's forum activity, including:
1.

the nature and quality of the defendant's

2.

whether the defendant engaged in

acts;

purposeful --rather than unintentional -- acts in order
to avail itself of the privilege and protections here;
and the substance -- not just form -- of the defendant's business relationship and acts should be ascertained; and,
3.

any other relevant matters bearing on "notions

of fair play and substantial justice."

578 P.2d at

854.
Irrespective of the standard used -- the doing
business concept and its enumerated criteria as analyzed in
Hill, or the minimum contact test with its attendant eviden-
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tiary hearing by the trial court as discussed in Abbott -Carnes has not subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the
Utah courts.

Consider, first, the following description of

Carnes' business operations:
Carnes is an unincorporated subdivison of Wehr
Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation engaged in
the manufacture of heating, ventilating and
refrigeration equipment.

Its office and factory

are located in Wisconsin, as are its records and
principal officers.

Carnes has never

qualified~

do business in the State of Utah and it does not
carry-on business in Utah.

It has no local offi-

ces, manufacturing facilities, warehouses, stores
or outlets in Utah; it has no affiliated company
in Utah; it has no agents or personnel residing ~
Utah nor do any personnel regularly visit Utah.
Carnes does not own real property in Utah; it does
not have personal property, including inventories,
in Utah._

Carnes has not engaged in any advertis-

ing directed specifically at potential customers
in the State of Utah,lO and it does not maintain a

10.

Other than by including a copy of Utah Air Sales'
card in the Carnes Company catalog.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-28Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

telephone listing in the state.

Carnes has no

bank accounts or investments in Utah.

Carnes

products are sold in Utah only by independent
sales representatives, but Carnes has no pecuniary
interest in or supervisory control over them.ll
(R.

135-138; 239-246; 251-254; 482-486; 517-521;

612-161; 645-653).
The foregoing facts were presented to the district court in
four separate proceedings.

On each occasion the issues of

whether Carnes was doing business in the State of Utah and
whether the local courts had acquired jurisdiction over it
pursuant to the long-arm statute, were determined adversely
to plaintiff:
On November 28, 1973, Carnes filed a motion to
quash the service and dismiss the complaint, pursuant to
Rule 12 (b) (2), (4), (5), U.R.C.P.

On October 18, 1974, Judge

Hall granted the motion, ruling that the court did not have
jurisdiction over Carnes.
On October 25, 1974, plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment and the issue of jurisdiction was before the court a second time.

On March 5,

1975, Judge Hall expressly declined to change his prior
ruling that long-arm jurisdiction over Carnes had not been
obtained.
11.

The business operations of the sales representatives and
their relationship to Carnes are described in Argument N of this
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The issue was considered for a third time when,

00

February 10, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion for an order
declaring that service of summons had been made on Carnes.
On March 3, 1977, Judge Taylor denied the motion, thereby
rejecting the plaintiff's jurisdictional issue again.
And, on Janury 11-12, 1978, the plaintiff received
a special hearing before Judge Leary in which to argue the
question of jurisdiction for the fourth time.

The hearing

was conducted in strict accordance with this Court's ins true·
tions in Abbott.

All parties were afforded an opportunity

to presenc witnesses, to introduce documents and evidence,
~;-.c

~=

~i-,-e

extensive argument, all designed to determine

the exlstence of jurisdiction over Carnes under the long-am
statute.

On the basis of that plenary hearing and a thor-

ough review of the pleadings, affidavits, and answers to
interrogatories, Judge Leary again held that Carnes was not
subject to local jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.
It is important to remember that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the jurisdictional allegations
in its complaint.
supra.

See Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Core'

Even a cursory review of the record demonstrates the

plaintiff has not been denied an opportunity to present all
of the evidence it could marshall concerning Carnes' busl-
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ness activities in Utah, and thereby satisfy its evidentiary
burden.

Resolution of the question is dependent upon the

trial court's determination of the factual matters and,
unfortunately for plaintiff, it simply has not convinced any
trier-of-fact of the correctness of its argument.

See

Dunham-Bush, Inc. v. Bill Hartmann Plumbing & Heating, Inc.,
30 Utah 2d 177, 515 P.2d 92, 94

(1973).

Now, this Court

should accord to the three trial court judges who have heard
this case the prerogative of weighing the evidence and of
drawing inferences from it, and upon that basis determining
the facts.
supra.

See Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp.,

The orders of dismissal granted by Judge Hall and

Judge Leary should be affirmed.

IV.

SERVICE OF PROCESS ON OFFICERS OF
LONG DEMING UTAH, INC., AND UTEMPUTAH AIR SALES, WAS NOT SERVICE ON
CARNES UNDER RULE 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.

Plaintiff filed its complaint against Carnes on
October 23, 1973.

It attempted to serve process on Carnes

in Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, and it attempted to serve Carnes in Utah by service on Lyn Felton.
At the time of service on October 29, 1973, Mr. Felton was
the vice-president of Long Deming Utah, Inc., the indepen-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-31Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dent sales representative for Carnes in Utah.

On November

28, 1973, Carnes filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2),
(4), and (5), U.R.C.P., to quash the service and dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over Carnes.

The motion was granted by Judge Hall

on October 18, 1974.

On March 5, 1975, he reconsidered his

order but declined to amend his determination that jurisdiction had not been obtained over Carnes.
In March, 1977, plaintiff again attempted to serve
Carnes in Wisconsin under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, and it
renewed its prior efforts to serve Carnes in Utah, this time
=~

ser~ice

on Richard Barrett McDowell.

At the time of

service, Mr. McDowell was the vice-president of Utemp, Inc.
Utemp was a Utah corporation which conducted portions of its
business activities through its unincorporated division known
as Utah Air Sales.

Utah Air Sales had succeeded Long Deming

Utah, Inc., as the independent sales representative for
Carnes in Utah.

On April 6, 1977, Carnes filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2), (3), (4) and (5), U.R.C.P.,
again contending the court did not have jurisdiction over
Carnes.

The motion to dismiss was based in part on the

consideration that the complaint served in Utah on Mr.
McDowell was insufficient as service of process on Carnes.
The motion to dismiss was granted by Judge Leary on May 30,
1978.
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Plaintiff challenges both orders of dismissal,
contending that service of process on either Long Deming or
Utah Air Sales was sufficient service on Carnes under Rule
4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.

It reasons that Long Deming and Utah Air

Sales were independent sales representatives for Carnes;
that their activities in Utah were on Carnes' behalf and
constitute doing business in the state by Carnes; and,
therefore, that service of process on them was tantamount to
service on Carnes.

The plaintiff's argument is incorrect.

The argument utterly ignores strict compliance
with the local procedural rule governing service.

In order

to serve process upon a corporation within the State of
Utah, a plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Rule
4 (e) ( 4) , U. R. C. P.

The rule provides:

(e)
Personal service within the state shall be as
follows:
(4)
Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association which is subject
to suit under a common name, by delivering a
copy thereof to an officer, a managing or
general agent, or to any other agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service
of process and, if the agent is one authorized
by statute to receive service and the statute
so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant.
If no such officer or agent can be
found in the county in which the action is
brought, then upon any such officer or ag7nt,
or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chlef
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clerk, or other agent having the management,
direction or control of any property of such
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the state.
If no such
officer or agent can be found in the sate, and
the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself
out as having, an office or place of business
in this state, or does business in this state,
then upon the person doing such business or in
charge of such office or place of business.
The statute recognizes personal service upon a corporation
only when it is made upon one of the enumerated individuals.
For instance, the rule provides that service may be made
upon an officer; a general agent; an agent specifically
authorized to receive service of process; an agent having
~he

~a~agement,

per~j

~lthin

direction or control of any corporate pro-

the state; or a person doing business or in

charge of a business office, when a defendant has advertised
or held itself out as doing business or having an office in
the state.
There is no evidence in the record to indicate
that either Long Deming or Utah Air Sales falls within any
of the foregoing five categories.

(R.

517-518;

614-615).

Neither was, for example, an officer of Carnes or Wehr Corporation.

Neither was a managing or general agent of either

business entity.

Neither has ever been appointed by Carnes

or Wehr Corporation to act as their agent to receive service
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of process in the state of Utah and, moreover, neither has
ever received such authority by the laws of this state.
In fact, Long Deming and Utah Air Sales bear
absolutely no relationship to Carnes which would substantiate
service of process on them.

They are independently owned

and operated business entities which act as local sales
representatives for various and differing manufacturers of
mechanical equipment.

(R.

482).

In that connection, each

has operated as the exclusive sales representative for
Carnes in Utah on separate occasions; Long Deming's representation extended from September 3, 1968, to September 15, 1975,
and Utah Air Sales immediately succeeded to that position.
Carnes' business dealings with Long Deming and with Utah Air
Sales were similar, and they were typical of dealings between
Long Deming, Utah Air Sales and other manufacturers.
4 82) .

(R.

Both Long Deming and Utah Air Sales operated as a

sales representative for various mechanical equipment manufacturers, merely offering for sale the Carnes' brand of
equipment along with other competing lines.

(R. 482).

Neither was an agent, servant or employee of Carnes but
merely a sales representative by contractual agreement.
517-518; 614-615).

(R.

Pursuant to the terms of that agreement,

each was able to develop the sale of Carnes products in any
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manner which it deemed advisable, without any control or
direction from Carnes.

For example, each could determine

which potential customers to contact and what time to devote
to customer colicitation.

Each had its own employees;

controlled the hours they work, the pay they receive, and
the basis on which they are paid -- all without direction
from Carnes.

Each received a commission on sales of Carnes'

equipment in Utah; no other remuneration was extended by
Ca=nes and each paid its own expenses without reimbursement
f=8m Carnes.

No specific employees were assigned solely to

3a!es of Carnes' equipment.

(R. 494).

Each solicited and

received orders in accordance with price schedules and terns
established by Carnes.

Neither had authority to bind or

commit Carnes; the acceptance or rejection of orders was
wholly within the discretion of Carnes, and any acceptance
or rejection was made by Carnes in Wisconsin.

(R.

492.)

Orders accepted by Carnes constituted agreements between it
and the customers.

Deliveries were as agreed between them an:

collections were the responsibility of Carnes, unless guaran~'
by the sales representative, which was an unusual circumstane
Invoicing was direct from Carnes to the customer, and the
customer paid Carnes directly.

Carnes' final agreements

with its customers were typically in the form of invoices
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subject to terms, conditions and warranty.

(R. 135-138;

239-246; 251-254; 482-486; 517-521; 612-616; 645-653).
In addition to the preceding format, Long Deming
Utah, Inc., and Utah Air Sales each made purchases from
Carnes for its own account, including products they held in
inventory and then resold to customers, and also products
for particular projects which they resold to their customers.
Such purchases were F.O.B. Wisconsin and Carnes retained
no interest in them, other than security, after they were
purchased.

Each was free to represent other manufacturers

in a capacity similar to that with Carnes and, in fact, each
did

represent other competing manufacturers.

The volume

of business from Carnes' products was less than half of the
total dollar volume for each.

(R. 135-138; 239-246; 251-254;

482-486; 517-521; 612-616; 645-653).
The foregoing items are important for two reasons.
First, they vividly indicate that the activities of Long Deming and Utah Air Sales in Utah were not on Carnes' behalf
and did not constitute doing business in the state by Carnes.
Therefore, Carnes cannot be served by serving either of them.
See, e.g., western Gas Appliances, Inc., v. Sevel, Inc., 123
Utah 229, 257 P.2d 950

(1953).

After reviewing all of the

evidence, Judge Leary reached this precise conclusion.

In
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his order of May 30, 1978, he made the following two determinations:

*

*

*

Service of process upon Richard B. McDowell,
an officer of an independent sales representative
of Defendant Carnes Company, was not service of
process upon Defendant Carnes Company within the
meaning of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service of process upon Lyn Felton, an officer of an independent sales representative of Defendant Carnes Company, was not service of process upon Defendant Carnes Company within the
meaning of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

*

*

*

Second, they pinpoint a dangerous flaw in the
pl~i~~iff's

ana

~tah

argument.

Observe that Long Deming Utah, Inc.,

Air Sales have done nothing beyond those activities

and responsibilities normally assumed by a manufacturers'
sales representative.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff vehemently

suggests that a foreign corporation is automatically subject
to local jurisdiction whenever business is conducted in this
manner by its local independent sales representative. Imagine
the effect of such a standard on the nation's manufacturers:
If activity by a distributor over whom there.
is no control other than a mutual right to dlscontinue the distributorship is to be regarded
as on behalf of the defendant, state lines will
essentially cease to exist for every manufacturer
whose goods move in interstate commerce. ~
Wheat Wafers, Inc., v. Venus Foods, Inc., 174
F. Supp. 633, 636 (D. ~ass. 1959).
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Indeed, consider whether it would render illusory the constitutional standard of due process in all questions of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations.

Also, con-

sider whether such service would assure that service upon a
sales representative would be effectively communicated to
the manufacturer itself.
Carnes contends the orders of dismissal granted by
Judge Hall and Judge Leary should be affirmed.

V.

THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE HALL AND
JUDGE LEARY WERE PROPER.

In the third point of its appeal brief the plaintiff is content to review and to comment upon the procedural
history of this case once more.

Carnes has no serious

dispute with most of what is said, so it will limit its
reply to the following brief comments.
The plaintiff criticizes Judge Hall for failing to
explain his rulings. 12

The elementary response to the alle-

gation is that findings by the court were not required.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
part:
... Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule
12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in
(emphasis added.)
Rule 4l(b).

12.

Appellant's Brief at 39, 40.
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Moreover, this Court has indicated that if the issues
material to a ruling on the question of a court's jurisdiction can be identified, it is not necessary for the court to
have made written findings enumerating them.

This principle

is aptly demonstrated in the opinion of McCarthy v. State,
Utah 2d 205, 265 P.2d 387 (1953).

In that case, plaintiff

undertook to do work upon a monument at the mouth of Emigration Canyon.

The other contracting party was the "This Is

the Place Monument Commission", a committee of citizens
appointed by the Governor of Utah to plan, raise funds for,
and erect such a monument.
pursLan~

Their appointment was made

to a recommendation by joint resolution of the

state iegislature, although the legal status of the commission and its relationship to the state in carrying out the
directives of the legislature and the governor were not
clearly defined.

The commission received and expended

appropriations from the state legislature and proceded to
have the monument erected.
A dispute developed over the construction work
done by the plaintiff and his entitlement to payment.

For

that reason he started an action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against the monument
commission, characterizing it as a voluntary association,
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and also against its members individually.

The commission

members claimed that neither the association nor its individual members were responsible under the contract since
they were simply acting for the State of Utah, which was the
real party in interest.

The federal court sustained their

contention and held, for that reason, that it had no jurisdiction of the plaintiff's action against the State of Utah.
The action was dismissed.
Approximately nine months later plaintiff instituted another suit against the State of Utah, the monument
commission, its executive secretary, and the members individually in the Third District Court of the State of Utah.
The action was eventually dismissed against the individual
defendants on the ground that the federal court had already
made a final determination they were not the real parties in
interest and were not personally responsible.

Plaintiff

appealed the dismissal to the Utah Supreme Court.

En route

to affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action, this
Court provided the following language:
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the Federal
Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,
the rule of res judicata is not applicable. He
cites Hutton v. Dodge wherein we announce~ t~e
general rule that a judgment becomes res JUdlcata
only when the court has acquired jurisdiction o~er
the subject matter and the parties. Thls rule lS
grounded upon the sound principle that litigants
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are entitled to have an adjudicaton upon the
merits.
It must be conceded that in most instances, if a tribunal has no jurisdiction, there
is no trial on the merits.
However, it is not
open to question that a judgment of dismissal
for want of jurisdiction is conclusive as to
the matters upon which the ruling was necessarily based.
In American Surety Co. v. Baldwin,
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated:
'The principles of
res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as
well as to other issues.'
No reason is apparent
why the rule should be less applicable to a decision denying jurisdiction than to one sustaining
it.
In the instant case, the conclusion that
the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction was necessarily based upon a determination of the critical
issue, i.e., that the individual defendants were
not personally responsible under the contract.
The other jurisdictional facts were present: The
amount exceeded $3,000; there was diversity of
citizenship between [the parties].
The question
whether the latter were responsible under the
contract and therefore proper parties defendant
was the one which was tried, argued and submitted
to the Federal Court.
The only logical deduction
that can be drawn is that such was the ground for
its order of dismissal. And this is true notwithstanding the fact that the court made no such
written finding.
The issue having been squarely
presented and determined, it is res judicata as
between these parties.
265 P.2d at 387. (citations
omitted).
The McCarthy opinion indicates that if the issues
material to a ruling on the question of the court's jurisdiction can be identified, it is not necessary for the court
to have made written findings enumerating them.

Here, there

were two principal issues material to the prior rulings on
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jurisdictionmade by Judge Hall.

In considering whether

Carnes fell within the parameters of the long-arm statute,
he had to consider whether the plaintiff's claim rose from
contracting to supply services or goods in Utah, and whether
the minimum contacts of Carnes with this state satisfied the
constitutional standards for due process.

These issues were

tried, argued and submitted to Judge Hall and he determined
them by finding no jurisdiction over Carnes.
Plaintiff also suggestsl3 that by denying Carnes'
petition for interlocutory appeal, this Court impliedly
expressed its disapproval of Judge Hall's decision to quash
the service of summons upon Carnes and dismiss it from the
action.

To make such a suggestion in the absence of an

opinion from the Court is to succumb to conjecture.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Carnes Company prays
the orders of dismissal be affirmed.

13.

Appellant's Brief at 45.
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